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Odmiany antyrealizmu

Seminarium w roku akad. 2024/2025, semestr II

 Lektury obowiązkowe:

0) Flocke V. (2019), Anti-Realism in Metaphysics, [in:] M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, London – New York: Routledge, 358–366.

1) Laudan L. (2018), Obalenie realizmu konwergentnego, [in:] M. Kotowski (red.), Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Wrocław: Oficyna Naukowa PFF, 29–65.

2) Wray K.B. (2015), Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29(1), 61–73.

3) Stanford P.K. (2018), Odrzucając pakt z diabłem. Jakiego rodzaju niedookreślenie powinniśmy traktować poważnie? [in:] M. Kotowski (red.), Spór o realizm naukowy. Mała antologia, Wrocław: Oficyna Naukowa PFF, 257–271.

4) Rodriguez-Pereyra G. (2024), Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism, [in:] A.R.J. Fisher, A.-S. Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties, London: Routledge, 184–194.

5) Merricks T. (2014), Do Ordinary Objects Exist? No, [in:] E.B. Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics, New York - London: Routledge, 135–148.

6) Westerhoff J. (2021), An Argument for Ontological Nihilism, Inquiry 67(1), 513–559.

7) Foster J. (1993), The Succinct Case for Idealism, [in:] H. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 293–313.

8) Pelczar M. (2018), Defending Phenomenalism, Philosophical Quarterly 69(276), 574–597.

9) Kroon F. (2011), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Philosophy Compass 6(11), 786–803.

10) Goswick D., Constructivism in Metaphysics, IEoPh [ https://iep.utm.edu/constructivism-in-metaphysics/ ].

11) Misak Ch. (2018), The Pragmatist Theory of Truth, [in:] M. Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 283–303.

12) Kovacs D.M. (2024), Conventionalist Accounts of Personal Identity Over Time, Philosophy Compass 19(8), 1–14.

13) Turner S. (2019), Relativism in the Social Sciences, [in:] M. Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, London – New York: Routledge, 416–424.

14) Epstein B. (2015), A Framework for Social Ontology, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46(2), 147–167.

15) Pritchard D., Ranalli Ch. (2016), Putnam on BIVs and Radical Scepticism, [in:] S.C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 75–89.

16) Varzi A.C. (2013), Fictionalism in Ontology, [in:] C. Barbero, M. Ferraris, A. Voltolini (eds.), From Fictionalism to Realism, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, 133–151.